legislative constraints constrain or compel democratic executives' conflict behavior during periods of economic decline? Although institutional constraints are thought to reduce democratic executives' propensity to engage in interstate conflict, other research suggests that such constraints may provide incentives to engage in diversionary uses of force. Incorporating work from the comparative study of economic voting and cross-national research on the diversionary use of force, this article contends that government arrangements -coalition, minority, weak party cohesion -influence democratic conflict behavior by (1) shaping the extent to which the executive is held accountable for the economy and (2) determining the executive's capacity to address the economy with legislation. Specifically, the argu ment presented here suggests that governing parties in coalition governments share the blame for a poor economy, reducing the likelihood that the executive initiates disputes in response to the economy.
Introduction
Democratic leaders are thought to be restricted in their conflict behavior when faced with legislative constraints (e.g. Clark & Nordstrom, 2005; Morgan & Campbell, 1991; Prins & Sprecher, 1999 Anderson, 1995; Powell & Whitten, 1993; Whitten & Palmer, 1999) , we argue that government arrangements (i.e. majority, minority, coalition, and weak party govern ments) condition the extent to which execu tives initiate disputes for domestic purposes. This article contributes to our understand ing of how democratic politics influence conflict behavior as well as the manner in which leaders contend with legislative con straints. We conclude that coalition partners 1 There is not a consensus concerning whether democra cies are more likely than autocracies to use force abroad for domestic political purposes, which we discuss below.
and majority oppositions do not serve as foreign policy Veto players ' (Tsebelis, 1995 Mesquita & Siverson, 1995; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Smith, 1996) suggests that such fea tures as minority government or the separ ation of powers limit the executive's autonomy in decisions to use force. In contrast, studies exploring the divisionary use of force hypoth esis (e.g. Davies, 2002; Gelpi, 1997) argue that constraints on democratic leaders' domestic policymaking autonomy provide incentives to initiate interstate disputes.
A prominent explanation for the demo cratic peace is the institutional constraints argument (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman, 1992; Maoz & Russett, 1993) . This perspec tive suggests that the institutional arrange ments of democratic regimes limit the executive's autonomy in decisions to use force. Specifically, executives are constrained by such structural features as elections, par ties, and legislatures (e.g. Dixon, 1994; Morgan & Schwebach, 1992) . These features can be thought of as Veto players ' (Tsebelis, 1995 an 'ideal' majoritarian system (Lijphart, 1999) , where a clear line of accountability can be drawn from voters to parliament to the executive (Strom, 2000) . Parliamentary executives need the support of parliament to make policy. Consequently, the more seats the executive's party holds in parliament, the less he or she is constrained in policymaking (Reiter & Tillman, 2002 partisan opponents in Congress are likely to support presidential national security policies (Fleisher & Bond, 1988; Stoll, 1987 Fordham, 1998), leader approval is falling (e.g. Morgan & Bickers, 1992; Ostrom & Job, 1986) , or popular unrest is on the rise (e.g. Davies, 2002; Gelpi, 1997) . Because leaders are thought to divert when direct policy measures to address the source of discontent are unavailable (e.g. Gelpi, 1997; Morgan & Bickers, 1992; Russett, 1990) , there is a tendency to conclude that the diversionary use of force is a pathology of democracies -specifically, powerful and mature ones (Pickering & Kisangani, 2005) . 3 Concerning the role of ex post constraints, the prospect of domestic political punishment for conflict behavior is unlikely to constrain a democratic leader's decision to use force. Because democratic leaders tend to select them selves into conflicts they expect to 'win' (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995; Gelpi & Griesdorf, 2001) , they are unlikely to be punished for conflict behavior that ends successfully (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Chiozza & Goemans, 2004 Although several studies find evidence of a link between democratic government and incentives to divert (e.g. Davies, 2002; Gelpi, 1997; Pickering & Kisangani, 2005) , other studies either find no such link or find that democratic leaders are less likely to use force in response to poor domestic conditions than their autocratic counterparts (Enterline & Gleditsch, 2000; Heldt, 1999; Miller, 1995 Lewis-Beck, 1988; Norpoth, 2001; Powell & Whitten, 1993) . Some stud ies (e.g. Anderson, 1995 Anderson, , 2000 Norpoth, 2001; Whitten & Palmer, 1999) (Anderson, 1995 (Anderson, , 2000 Bawn & Rosenbluth, 2006; Narud, 1996) .
Coalition
executives are less accountable because blame for the economy is likely to be distributed across governing parties, rather than focused on a single party (e.g. Anderson, 2000; Powell & Whitten, 1993; Whitten & Palmer, 1999) . The executive's party can also use its position as the coalition leader to shift blame for problems to other parties, reduc ing accountability (Anderson, 1995 (Anderson, , 2000 substitute a foreign policy in place of an eco nomic reform may be of the form e/N, which suggests that the costs to the executive's party of economic decline are adjusted by the number of parties in government. When N = 1, the full costs are imposed. But, ceteris paribus, the costs are mitigated when N > I (Anderson, 1995; Narud, 1996; Powell & Whitten, 1993) , reducing the likelihood that the executive seeks to pursue foreign policy to demonstrate his or her competence. Now, let 7" be the total number of seats in the legislature; G is the number of members For the executive to substitute a foreign policy in place of an economic reform in the effort to demonstrate leadership capacity, we should expect that elN> (pG + qO)y or ?>N(pG+qO).
( 1) The conditions under which the inequal ity is satisfied offer expectations about the influence of government arrangements and the economy on international conflict initi ation. Others things being equal, this condi tion is increasingly difficult to satisfy when N > 1. This is consistent with our discus sion of the extent to which coalition govern ments are held accountable for the state of the economy. As the number of parties in government increases, the executive may be able to escape the ire of voters by empha sizing other issues of importance to party supporters and shifting blame to coalition partners (Anderson, 1995 (Anderson, , 2000 Narud, 1996) . Moreover, if a coalition executive expects to be held accountable for the eco nomy, G may be sufficiently large to pro vide the opportunity to garner support for remedial economic policy via logrolling (e.g. Bawn & Rosenbluth, 2006; Laver & Shepsle, 1996; Weingast, 1979 tive's party remains a large target for voters because a minority government typically holds a plurality of seats (Anderson, 1995 (Anderson, , 2000 Narud, 1996 ; see also Cox, 1990 ). In other words, a minority executive's party should be a larger target for voters than a coalition executive's party. The case for minority governments: given that p > q, O > G, the implication is that H2: Minority governments are more likely than majority governments to initiate international disputes in response to declining economic performance. 6 In the interests of isolating the effects of institutional arrangements of policy choices, the formal model necessar ily simplifies the theoretical argument. One way in which it does so is by assuming that all parties have the ability and incentive to respond to poor economic growth with remedial economic policy, regardless of the specific policy area around which the party was formed. Our awareness of this concern partially drives our use of GDP growth as a broad measure of economic success that similarly threatens all ideological types of parties. Geographic proximity also exerts a strong influence on the probability that a dyad experiences a dispute (e.g. Bremer, 1992) .
The nearer two states are to each other, the more likely they are to engage in a dispute.
Thus, we include contiguity as a control for proximity, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the members of the dyad share a land border or are separated by 150 miles or less of water (Stinnett et al., 2002) .
Empirical Results
We conducted probit analyses of the directed dyads in which the OECD nations were members, 1950-97, using the Generalized
Estimating Equation procedure (GEE).14 12
We use the net democracy score for each state, which is defined as its democracy score minus its autocracy score. 13 Relative capabilities are measured as follows: State A's capabilities / (State A + Target's capabilities). 14 The estimates were obtained using Stata 8's XTGEE procedure with a probit link and AR(1) autocorrelation structure specified (Zorn, 2001 ). In addition, we account for unit heterogeneity and temporal dependence using task of empirically evaluating our theoretical framework, we turn to the remainder of the models in Table I . Table displays negative binomial estimates obtained from a GEE regression with AR( 1) correlation structure specified.
The numbers in parentheses are semi-robust standard errors. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01; one-tailed tests. N = 969.
executives plagued by weak party cohesion and economic decline may seek to demon strate their leadership competence via for eign policy rather than battle for a legislative consensus over economic policy.
In addition to the dyadic analyses, we examined the interactive effects of the economy and government arrangements on dispute initiation using a cross-sectional time-series dataset composed of state-years (i.e. monads). The dependent variable in these analyses is the annual count of MID initiations by the OECD member states. King (1988) shows that an event count, such as the number of dispute initiations, is suitable for drawing inferences about the underlying process that generated the events.
In the monadic analyses, we include the Second, we excluded the USA from the sample and re-estimated all of the dyadic and monadic specifications presented in Tables I and IV. An examination of the cases detailed in the appendix reveals that the USA is responsible for most of the disputes initiated by the OECD countries. Moreover, the USA does not experience coalition government, but frequently experiences minority govern ment and is plagued by a weak party system.
Consequently, the results could be due to the presence of the USA. However, the results of these analyses continued to support our hypotheses. We found that in all hypothesis tests save one -the marginal effect for minor ity government x GDP fails to attain signifi cance in the monadic analysis -the expected relationships were borne out in spite of the exclusion of the USA.
Overall, our results are suggestive of the the oretical argument. Hypothesis 1 is supported; we find that coalitions tend to reduce the likelihood of international dispute initiation as journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 461 number 61 november 2009 (1991) argue that minority governments in parliamentary systems closely parallel divided govern ments in the US case. In both situations, the leader has to receive legislative support from those outside the leaders' partisan base.
